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NOTES
Required Reports and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination: A Substantive View
of the Claim by Silence
Introduction
In 1927 the United States Supreme Court ruled that an individual
faced with a request for disclosure of potentially incriminating informa-
tion must assert the privilege against self-incrimination1 affirmatively in
order to claim its benefit.2 In light of this "presentation requirement,"
Congress enacted a series of statutes requiring individuals to report their
activities in criminally suspect areas. The statutes,3 which carried crimi-
nal sanctions for failure to report,4 were drawn so narrowly that they
created an incriminating inference of criminal liability against anyone
subject to the reporting requirement. Affirmatively asserting the privi-
lege against self-incrimination would itself incriminate the individual by
identifying him as subject to the reporting requirement.
The Supreme Court confronted these statutes in a series of decisions
collectively called the "Marchetti cases." 5 Because any affirmative asser-
1. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that no person "shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927), discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 13-25. See also Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination and the Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 115-21.
The presentation requirement enables the government to evaluate its need for the information
sought and then either to grant immunity from prosecution, see 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982), al-
lowing compulsion of the information, or to forego the information altogether. See infra text
accompanying notes 173-175.
3. I.R.C. §§ 4401, 4411 & 4412 (1982) (wagering tax); I.R.C. § 5841 (1982) (firearm
registration); 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C. 1939) § 2590 (1955) (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 4741 (1954)),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1101(b)(3)(A), 84 Stat. 1292 (1970) (marihuana transfer
tax).
4. I.R.C. §§ 7202, 7203, 7262 & 7272 (1982) (wagering tax); I.R.C. §§ 5861, 5871 &
5872 (1982) (firearms registration); 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C. 1939) § 2590 (1955) (codified at 26
U.S.C.A. § 4744 (1954)), repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. III, § 1101(b)(3)(A), 84 Stat.
1292 (1970) (marihuana transfer tax).
5. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39
(1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85
(1968).
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tion of the privilege against these reporting requirements would itself be
incriminating, the Court held in the Marchetti cases that the privilege
protected the defendants from sanctions for failure to report even though
they had not presented their self-incrimination claims to the govern-
ment.6 The Marchetti cases laid the basis for a presentation requirement
doctrine later termed the "claim by silence" by the Burger Court.7
Twice during the 1983 Term, in Selective Service System v. Minnesota
Public Interest Research Group8 and Minnesota v. Murphy,9 the Court
addressed the claim by silence. Both times the Court's analysis appeared
to be a significant retrenchment from the Warren Court's analysis in the
Marchetti cases. The Court appeared both to restrict the availability of
the claim by silence and to redefine the nature of the presentation
requirement.
This Note identifies two contrasting views of the presentation re-
quirement and the claim by silence. Under the Burger Court's proce-
dural view, the privilege against self-incrimination comes into play only
when properly asserted. Proper assertion requires the claimant to invoke
the privilege expressly when confronted by a request for possibly incrimi-
nating information. Failure to present the claim in this manner results in
forfeiture of the privilege, either as a "waiver"" ° or as a failure to satisfy a
procedural prerequisite." The claim by silence is a narrow exception to
the presentation requirement applicable only in cases factually similar to
the Marchetti cases. Under the procedural view, the only substantive
question is whether the privilege, when properly asserted, applies to pro-
tect the claimant on the particular facts.
By contrast, under the Warren Court's substantive view, an individ-
ual must present a claim of the privilege only when the government's
interest in the information gained by presentation outweighs the individ-
ual's interest in avoiding the incriminating inference arising from presen-
tation. When presentation of a claim against a narrowly drawn reporting
requirement creates a strong inference of criminal liability, the govern-
mental interests must justify the increased incrimination in order to sup-
port the presentation requirement. If the governmental interests are
6. See infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
7. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 658 n. 11 (1976). The Court's terminology is
criticized infra at note 215 and accompanying text.
8. 104 S. Ct. 3348 (1984).
9. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
10. The "waiver" terminology has been discredited as incorrectly implying that the claim-
ant, with full knowledge of the presentation requirement, has intentionally and voluntarily
waived his right to claim the privilege. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 n.9 (1976).
By contrast, under the procedural view "an individual may lose the benefit of the privilege
without making a knowing and intelligent waiver." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 425
(1984) (quoting Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 n.9 (1976)).
11. The most authoritative statement of the procedural view is in Garner v. United States,
424 U.S. 648 (1976), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 166-177.
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insufficient, the presentation requirement will not lie.12
This Note analyzes the development of the claim by silence through
the Warren Court era and then examines the Burger Court's response to
the doctrine. The Note argues that the Burger Court has severely limited
the applicability of the Warren Court's precedents and has adopted the
procedural view. Finally, the Note concludes that the substantive view is
the correct analysis of the claim by silence and that the Court's current
analysis of the doctrine has several shortcomings.
I. The Developing Doctrine
A. United States v. Sullivan
Justice Holmes laid the groundwork for the Marchetti cases in 1927
with his opinion in United States v. Sullivan.13 Sullivan, a bootlegger
during Prohibition, had raised the privilege as a defense in his prosecu-
tion for willful failure to file a federal income tax return. He argued that
the return, by requiring him to state his occupation, called for incrimi-
nating information and that the privilege protected his failure to file any
return at all. 4 The Court unanimously rejected this claim, calling it an
"extreme if not extravagant application of the Fifth Amendment."15 Be-
cause only a few questions on the return required possibly incriminating
responses, the privilege did not allow Sullivan to refuse to fie at all and
thereby to avoid responding to the majority of nonincriminating
requests.
12. The importance of the governmental information interest in a given instance may be
gauged by the importance of the ultimate end for which the information is used and the impor-
tance of the information in effecting that end. Mansfield, supra note 2, at 160. The govern-
mental interest in the information gained from presentation of a claim of the privilege is
distinct from the governmental interest in the information sought by the request. Presentation
informs the government that the response may be incriminating. This information (1) identi-
fies an individual as subject to the reporting requirement, see Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at
3366 n.18 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("invocation of the Fifth Amendment... gives the Gov-
ernment a different quality of information"), and (2) alerts the government that the privilege
may shield the individual from responding. The latter information allows the government to
weigh the importance of the information sought against the risk of not obtaining the informa-
tion over the assertion of the privilege. If the information is sufficiently important, the govern-
ment can compel a response by extending immunity to the individual under 18 U.S.C. § 6002
(1982). See infra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
Although the governmental information interest in presentation of a claim of the privilege
is distinct from the interest in the information sought, the importance of the interest in presen-
tation depends on the importance to the government of the information sought. As the impor-
tance of the information sought increases, the importance of identifying those subject to the
reporting requirement and of alerting the government to the possible bar to the information
increases.
13. 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
14. Sullivan v. United States, 15 F.2d 809, 811 (4th Cir. 1926). The circuit court had
agreed with Sullivan, finding the privilege a complete defense to the charge. Id. at 813.
15. 274 U.S. at 263-64.
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Sullivan's theory troubled Justice Holmes primarily because it
would deny the government the opportunity to obtain information re-
garding illegally earned income by the efficient self-reporting mechanism
of the Revenue Act. Justice Holmes believed that Sullivan should first
present his self-incrimination claim to the government before the protec-
tion of the privilege would be available.
[I]f the defendant desired to test [any question against the privi-
lege] he should have tested it in the return so that it could be
passed upon. He could not draw a conjurer's circle around the
whole matter by his own declaration that to write any word upon
the government blank would bring him into danger of the law.16
Since the claim by silence later developed as an exception to this
rule,' 7 whether the claim is procedural or substantive derives, in the first
instance, from whether Justice Holmes' principle was procedural or sub-
stantive. Unfortunately, Sullivan leaves this question open. One inter-
pretation of the opinion holds that presentation is a necessary procedural
prerequisite to availability of the privilege. The Supreme Court read Sul-
livan this way in Unites States v. Kahriger:18 "Since appellee failed to
register [and accordingly failed to present his claim] .... it is difficult to
see how he can now claim the privilege even assuming that the disclosure
of violations of law is called for."' 9
At least one commentator, however, has suggested that Justice
Holmes' analysis was more complex than the opinion reveals.20 Justice
Holmes concluded that Sullivan should have filed the return in full, mak-
ing written claims of the privilege only in response to the specific ques-
tions he felt were incriminating. 2' Yet even this procedure is
incriminating to some extent because invoking the protection of the privi-
lege in response to a specific question implies that the correct answer is
something the claimant wishes to conceal.22 Since Sullivan allows this
incrimination, the decision arguably stands for the substantive proposi-
tion that the government's interest in obtaining self-reported income in-
formation for revenue purposes outweighs the individual's interest in
preventing the compulsion of the incrimination inherent in asserting the
privilege.23 Indeed, the government's informational interest in Sullivan
appears to be particularly compelling: collecting revenues is a necessary
governmental function, and self-reporting of income is vital to revenue
16. Id. at 264.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 63-90, 165-177.
18. 345 U.S. 22 (1953). Kahriger was overruled by Marchetti, 390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968).
19. 345 U.S. at 32.
20. Mansfield, supra note 2, at 117-21.
21. Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 263-64.
22. Mansfield, supra note 2, at 117. The inference is made possible by the general report-
ing requirement, to which an exception lies only when the response would be incriminating.
Id. at 118.
23. Id. at 121.
collection.24 In addition, the resulting invasion of the privilege is com-
paratively slight: the incriminating inference against Sullivan would be
that he believed disclosure of his occupation would implicate him crimi-
nally. This inference serves merely to arouse the government's suspicion
about Sullivan's occupation, but it does not reveal that he is a bootlegger
or even a criminal." Thus, Sullivan can be read to support either the
procedural or the substantive view.
B. The Procedural View in the Wake of Sullivan
After Sullivan, Congress imposed occupational, excise or transfer
taxes on individuals engaged in several specific, criminally suspect classes
of activity. 6 The statutes required taxpayers to file special tax returns
and to register with government officials, furnishing their names, ad-
dresses, and other identifying information. 7 In the case of the federal
wagering tax, the legislation required taxpayers to post revenue stamps
indicating payment28 and directed local Internal Revenue offices to main-
tain lists of the taxpayers for public inspection and to provide certified
copies of the lists to local prosecutors upon request.2 9 A taxpayer's fail-
ure to comply with the reporting requirements carried criminal sanc-
tions.30 These enactments related generally to unlawful activities as to
which the federal government could not exercise primary criminal juris-
diction. However, because of the perceived need to use federal power to
control the activities, Congress indirectly created federal criminal juris-
diction as an incidence to its taxing power.31
Because the reporting requirements applied solely to specific, likely
criminal groups, the mere applicability of the requirement identified a
24. Id.
25. Id. at 117.
26. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 4401-4424 (1982) (wagering tax); I.R.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1982) (Na-
tional Firearms Act); 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C. 1939) §§ 2590-93 (1955) (codified at 26 U.S.C.A.
§§ 4741-44 (1954)), repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1101(b)(3)(A), 84 Stat. 1292 (1970)
(Marihuana Tax Act); cf 50 U.S.C. §§ 780-826 (1982) (Subversive Activites Control Act); 18
U.S.C.A. § 1407 (1969), repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, § I101(b)(1)(A), 84 Stat. 1292 (1970)
(requiring narcotics addicts and felons to register with customs agents on leaving or entering
the United States).
27. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 42; Haynes, 390 U.S. at 88; Leary, 395 U.S. at 14-15.
28. I.R.C. § 6806(c) (1982).
29. 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C. 1939) §§ 3275, 3292 (1955) (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 6107
(1954)), repealed by Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 203(a), 82 Stat. 1235 (1968). This directive also
apparently applied to the firearms tax. Haynes, 390 U.S. at 99-100.
30. I.R.C. §§ 7202, 7203, 7262 & 7272 (1967) (wagering tax); I.R.C. §§ 5861, 5871 &
5872 (1967) (firearms registration); 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C. 1939) § 2593 (1955) (codified at 26
U.S.C.A. § 4744 (1954)), repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1 101(b)(3)(A), 84 Stat. 1292
(1970) (marihuana tax).
31. See Haynes, 390 U.S. at 87-88 n.4; United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 27 n.3
(1953).
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person as a likely criminal.32 As a consequence, there was a strong disin-
centive to compliance with these schemes. Noncompliance, however,
had two negative consequences: first, one became subject to criminal
penalties, and second, he fell into the trap of Sullivan: failure to register
or to file a required report became fatal to a claim of the privilege as a
defense in a prosecution for noncompliance.33
The Sullivan dilemma was reinforced in United States v. Kahriger,34
in which the Court upheld the federal wagering tax against a fifth amend-
ment challenge. 35 The majority in Kahriger read Sullivan as creating a
mandatory procedural rule for asserting the privilege. Significantly,
however, the Court did not uphold the gambling tax solely on the basis of
Sullivan, but found an alternative basis for its decision.36 Whether this
indicates that the majority was uncertain over the Sullivan rule as a
purely procedural mandate is unclear. It is clear, however, that the Kah-
riger Court was divided on the majority's reading of Sullivan. Two dis-
senters-Justices Black and Douglas-would have found that the statute
violated the privilege.37 They apparently saw no procedural bars to Kah-
riger's claim.
Justice Jackson's concurrence in Kahriger38 reveals the competing
interests involved in the fifth amendment challenge to the statute, which
"approache[d] the fair limits of constitutionality: ' 39
[W]e deal here with important and contrasting values in our
scheme of government, and it is important that neither be allowed
to destroy the other.
.. The Fifth Amendment should not be construed to impair
the taxing power conferred by the original Constitution, and espe-
cially by the Sixteenth Amendment, further than is absolutely
required.
... [A]U taxation has a tendency.., to discourage the activity
taxed ....
But here is a purported tax law which requires no reports and
lays no tax except on specified gamblers whose calling in most
states is illegal. It requires this group to step forward and identify
32. See infra text accompanying notes 80-84.
33. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 49; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67.
34. 345 U.S. 22 (1953), rev'd, Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968).
35. "Since appellee failed to register for the wagering tax, it is difficult to see how he can
now claim the privilege even assuming that the disclosure of violations of law is called for."
345 U.S. at 32.
36. Id. at 32-33. The Court held that even a properly asserted claim of the privilege
would fail under a doctrine holding that the privilege related only to past actions, while the
disclosures related to prospective actions. This reasoning, reiterated in Lewis v. United States,
348 U.S. 419 (1955), also was repudiated in Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 52-54.
37. 345 U.S. 22, 36 (1953) (Black, J., with whom Douglas, J., concurred, dissenting).
Justice Frankfurter dissented on different grounds. Id. at 37 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
38. 345 U.S. 22, 34 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 36.
themselves.... [I]t seems to be a plan to tax out of existence the
professional gambler whom it has been found impossible to prose-
cute out of existence.'
Justice Jackson's concern was with striking an accommodation be-
tween the policy of the privilege and Congress' exercise of the taxing
power. In striking this balance he came close to joining Justices Black
and Douglas in dissent.4 ' Significantly, like the dissenters, Justice Jack-
son did not consider Sullivan to be a procedural impediment to Kah-
riger's claim.42
C. The Communist Party Cases
A majority of the Court first hinted that it was willing to depart
from Sullivan in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Board.43 In that case, the Court upheld the validity of the Subversive
Activities Control Act of 1950' against, among other constitutional at-
tacks, a fifth amendment challenge to the Act's registration provisions."
The Court found that the claim was not "ripe" because every condition
precedent to the duty to register had not yet occurred, and because the
Communist Party, rather than the affected individuals, raised the
privilege.46
Yet, after stating this holding, the Court went on to suggest that,
even though the Communist Party had not registered and thus had not
presented its claim of the privilege under Sullivan, it might distinguish
Sullivan and find the privilege properly asserted in the circumstances of
registration under the Act.47 The Court stated that registration under
the Act may constitute a more serious invasion of the privilege than had
occurred in Sullivan: "the obligation to file a registration statement com-
pels a few particular individuals to come forward, identify themselves,
and to suggest, at least, their connection with a relatively limited poten-
40. Id. at 34-35.
41. Justice Jackson stated in Kahriger, "I concur..., but with such doubt that if the
minority agreed upon an opinion which did not impair legitimate use of the taxing power I
would probably join it." Id. at 34.
42. Justice Jackson concurred in the judgment not because he agreed with the majority's
reading of Sullivan, but because he feared the long-term consequences of "[t]he evil of a judi-
cial decision impairing the legitimate taxing power by extreme constitutional interpretations."
Id at 36.
43. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
44. 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-826 (1982).
45. 50 U.S.C.A. § 786(a), (c) (1951), repealed by Pub. L. No. 90-237, § 5, 81 Stat. 766
(1968) (requiring the Communist Party's officers to register as such with the United States
Attorney General).
46. 367 U.S. at 105-07; cf K. RIPPLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 89 (1984) (ripeness
analysis).
47. 367 U.S. at 108.
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tial sphere of criminal conduct."48 In addition, the Court hinted that the
government's interest in the presentation of a claim may be weaker under
the Act than in Sullivan. In Sullivan, because only a few questions on
the return sought possibly incriminating responses, presenting the claim
to each specific incriminating question permitted the government to ob-
tain most of the information sought. By contrast, in Communist Party
"any claim of the privilege would involve the withholding of all informa-
tion"49 from the government; as a result, the presentation requirement
would serve no purpose.
Four years later the unanimous Court in Albertson v. Subversive Ac-
tivities Control Board" carried out its earlier suggestion, finding provi-
sions similar to those in Communist Party51 unconstitutional under the
Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General had determined that the peti-
tioners in Albertson were members of the Communist Party and ob-
tained orders from the Subversive Activities Control Board requiring
them to register.52 The petitioners claimed the privilege as a defense to
the issuance of registration orders, which clearly presented a Sullivan
issue. Under Sullivan as construed in Kahriger, the petitioners' failure to
submit any registration statement should have defeated their claims.
Writing for the majority, however, Justice Brennan went directly to
the substantive incrimination issue, finding the registration requirement
"inconsistent" 53 with the privilege because it "require[d] an admission of
membership in the Communist Party," as to which "mere association...
presents sufficient threat of prosecution to support a claim of privi-
lege."54 The Court then examined Sullivan in response to the govern-
ment's argument "that petitioners might answer some questions and
appropriately claim the privilege on the form as to others, but cannot fail
to submit a registration statement altogether."5" The Court read Sulli-
48. Id. at 108-09.
49. Id. at 109.
50. 382 U.S. 70 (1965) (White, J., not participating; Black and Clark, JJ., joining in the
majority opinion and concurring separately).
51. 50 U.S.C.A. § 787(a), (c) (1951), repealed by Pub. L. No. 90-237, § 5, 81 Stat. 766
(1968). Communist Party had involved 50 U.S.C.A. § 786(a), (c) (1951). See supra note 45
and accompanying text.
52. 382 U.S. at 71-73. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 792(a) (1951). The orders were affirmed in
Albertson v. Subversive Activites Control Bd., 332 F.2d 317 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
53. 382 U.S. at 78.
54. Id. at 77. The form, reproduced as an appendix to the opinion, id. at 82, had five
blank spaces, three calling for the registrant's name, one calling for his address and one seeking
the name of the Communist organization of which the registrant was a member. The Act also
required an accompanying registration statement, reproduced at 382 U.S. at 83-85. Comple-
tion of any of these requests would have incriminated the respondent by necessarily linking
him with the Communist Party. The Court premised its analysis on the assumption that
"nothing in the Act or regulations permits less than literal and full compliance with the re-




van as standing for two propositions: (1) claiming the privilege in re-
sponse to every request for information on an income tax return is
"virtually frivolous," 56 and (2) some tribunal, rather than the taxpayer,
must be the "final arbiter of the merits of the claim."'57 Based on this
reading, the Court found the first proposition inapposite to the registra-
tion statement, which had a pervasively incriminating effect, thus sub-
stantiating the claim of privilege.5 8  Further, the petitioners'
presentation of their claims to the Control Board had satisfied the second
Sullivan requirement. 9
Significantly, the Court in Albertson did not consider Sullivan in the
context of a procedural difficulty with the petitioners' claim. Indeed,
aside from a ripeness issue,6 ° the Court found no difficulty at all with the
self-incrimination claim. Under Sullivan and Kahriger, the Court could
have chosen to require presentation of the privilege on the registration
form in response to specific incriminating questions before considering
the fifth amendment issue properly presented. That the Court unani-
mously bypassed this option reveals a remarkable shift in its approach to
Sullivan and to the privilege. As one commentator observed at the time:
It seems clear that Albertson stands at the threshold of an effort by
the Court to reexamine [Sullivan, Kahriger and Lewis v. United
States61], perhaps in the hope of rationalizing them more success-
fully, perhaps with the thought that changed notions of the privi-
lege that have emerged in various contexts must now be brought to
bear on the problems raised by these older cases. The result may
be that relatively more weight will be given to the policy of the
privilege as against the government's need for information.62
II. Adoption of the Substantive View
A. The Marchetti Cases
After Albertson, the Court heard four appeals addressing attacks
against the Sullivan presentation rule. These cases involved fifth amend-
ment challenges to four different federal reporting statutes aimed at spe-
cific groups. The Court granted certiorari in Marchetti v. United States
to determine whether it should overrule Kahriger.63 Marchetti had been
convicted of willful failure to register and pay the federal occupational




60. Id. at 74-77.
61. Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955); see supra note 36.
62. Mansfield, supra note 2, at 116.
63. 385 U.S. 1000 (1967). The Court in Marchetti also granted certiorari to reexamine the
"future acts" doctrine established in Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955). The
Marchetti Court subsequently overruled Lewis. 390 U.S. at 52-54.
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tax on wagering.' 4 A Second Circuit panel had upheld the conviction
against his argument that the wagering tax violated the Fifth Amend-
ment.65 As a companion case to Marchetti, in Grosso v. United States1
6
the Court reviewed a conviction for conspiracy to evade67 and willful
failure to report and pay excise taxes68 under the wagering tax scheme.
Grosso had raised the privilege as a defense at trial, as grounds for ac-
quittal after trial and as grounds for a new trial.
6 9
Along with these cases the Court in Haynes v. United States7' re-
viewed a conviction under the National Firearms Act71 for possession of
an unregistered firearm. Registration was required primarily of persons
who obtained possession of weapons in violation of the Act and, as a
result, were subject to prosecution.72 Haynes had moved for dismissal
before trial on fifth amendment grounds and pled guilty when the motion
was denied.73 None of the defendants in these cases had tendered pay-
ment of the taxes imposed or remitted any required reports or
registration.74
Although decided in the Term following Marchetti, Leary v. United
States7 contained reasoning that was virtually identical to that in the
Marchetti trilogy. Timothy Leary76 had been convicted of knowingly
transporting and concealing marihuana without having paid the transfer
tax imposed by the Marihuana Tax Act.77 Although not so charged,
Leary also apparently failed to comply with the Act's registration provi-
sions, 78 which were modelled partly on the National Firearms Act at
64. I.R.C. §§ 4411, 4412 (1982), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 26-33.
65. United States v. Costello, 352 F.2d 848, 851 (2d Cir. 1965).
66. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982). The conspiracy conviction, although reversed, 390 U.S. at 70,
is not pertinent to this discussion.
68. I.R.C. § 4401 (1982).
69. 390 U.S. at 63.
70. 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
71. I.R.C. § 5861 (1982) (making possession illegal); I.R.C. § 5841 (1982) (statutory re-
quirement of registration).
72. 390 U.S. at 96.
73. Id. at 86-87.
74. See Marchetti 390 U.S. at 40-42; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 63; Hlaynes. 390 U.S. at 86.
75. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
76. Leary was notorious in the late 1960's as an advocate of the hallucinogenic drug LSD.
See MARQUIS WHO'S WHO INC., 2 WHO's WHO IN AMERICA 1922 (43d ed. 1984).
77. 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C. 1939) § 2590(a), (b) (1955) (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 4741
(1954)) imposed a transfer tax on all transfers of marihuana. 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C. 1939) § 2593
(1955) (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 4744 (1954)), under which Leary was convicted, imposed
criminal sanctions on persons who transported or concealed marihuana without having paid
the transfer tax. The Marihuana Tax Act has been repealed since Leary. Pub. L. No. 91-513,
§ 1101(b)(3)(A), 84 Stat. 1292 (1970).
78. 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C. 1939) §§ 2591, 3231 (1955) (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 4742,
4753 (1954)), repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1101(b)(3)(A), 84 Stat. 1292 (1970).
issue in Haynes.79
Justice Harlan, who wrote the Court's opinion in all four decisions,
concluded that the requirements of the taxing schemes unconstitutionally
compelled self-incriminating information. The taxed activities generally
were illegal under the laws of most states,80 and the solicited information
was readily available for use by local prosecutors.81 Any submission of
information or payment of tax necessarily would identify the taxpayer as
a participant in the taxed activity.82 In Grosso the Court stated: "The
return is expressly designed for the use only of those engaged in the wa-
gering business; its submission, and the replies demanded by each of its
questions, evidence in the most direct fashion the fact of the taxpayer's
wagering activities."83  As a result, the statutes violated the Fifth
Amendment, and the privilege would protect the petitioners unless they
were "foreclosed from asserting the constitutional privilege."
84
Justice Harlan next considered the claims in light of Kahriger.85 In
Marchetti, the Court, relying on Albertson, stated that Kahriger rested on
the twin concerns evident in Sullivan: (1) preventing frivolous claims,
and (2) having a tribunal, rather than the taxpayer, determine the merits
of a claim.86 The Court reasoned that neither concern was sufficient to
defeat Marchetti's claim. First, Marchetti's assertion was far from frivo-
lous. Second, the latter concern was "unpersuasive in this situation.
'87
[E]very element of these requirements would have served to in-
criminate petitioner; to have required him to present his claim to
Treasury officers would have obliged him 'to prove guilt to avoid
admitting it.' ... In these circumstances, we cannot conclude that
his failure to assert the privilege to Treasury officials at the mo-
ment the tax payments were due irretrievably abandoned his con-
stitutional protection. Petitioner is under sentence for violation of
statutory requirements which he consistently asserted at and after
79. 395 U.S. at 15-16.
80. See Leary, 395 U.S. at 16-18; Marchett, 390 U.S. at 44-47; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64.
81. See Marchetti 390 U.S. at 47-48; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 66.
82. "[EJvery portion of these requirements had the direct and unmistakable consequence
of incriminating petitioner... ." Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 49 (emphasis added).
83. 390 U.S. at 65 (emphasis added). In Haynes the Court stated that "the correlation
between obligations to register and violations can only be regarded as exceedingly high, and a
prospective registrant realistically can expect that registration will substantially increaie the
likelihood of his prosecution." 390 U.S. at 97.
84. 390 U.S. at 67.
85. Kahriger was a directly applicable precedent with respect to Marchetti's assertion of
the privilege. 390 U.S. at 49-50. However, Grosso's claim involved a provision of the wagering
tax not addressed in Kahriger, and hence Kahriger was not deemed controlling. 390 U.S. at 67
n.5. Nor was Kahriger applicable to Haynes, a firearms case. The Court in Marchetti also
reexamined its decision in Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955), which involved issues
not relevant here. See supra note 36.
86. 390 U.S. at 50.
87. Id.
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trial to be unconstitutional; no more can here be required.88
In these circumstances, there was no policy basis for denying the
protection of the privilege. Accordingly, the Marchetti Court overruled
Karhriger.89 Finally, the Court found that Marchetti, Grosso, Haynes
and Leary all had properly asserted their claims and that the privilege
provided a complete defense in their prosecutions.90
The Court did not question the validity of Sullivan, but found it to
be unpersuasive precedent in the Marchetti cases. Consequently, after the
Marchetti cases, fifth amendment jurisprudence distinguished the federal
income tax from the federal wagering tax, marihuana tax and firearms
registration. With respect to federal income tax returns, most requests
for information were not so incriminating as to be unjustified; hence, a
total failure to file a return on grounds of self-incrimination was frivo-
lous, and the taxpayer was not permitted to be the final arbiter of his own
claim of privilege.91 Yet with respect to the wagering tax, the marihuana
tax, and firearms registration, submitting any information necessarily im-
plied that the respondent was engaged in criminally suspect activities,
whether legal or not. Under the Marchetti cases, the privilege protected
the respondent from prosecutions for failure to file or register without
regard to whether the proper tribunal passed on the claim.
There was, however, no theory or unifying principle to explain the
different results in these cases. In the Marchetti cases, Justice Harlan
may have relied on the inequity of the impossible dilemma created by
Kahriger: If Sullivan required presentation to assert the privilege prop-
erly, yet every element of the wagering tax sought incriminating informa-
tion, a taxpayer faced the choice of either "prov[ing] guilt to avoid
admitting it"92 or losing any benefit from the privilege because he chose
not to assert it properly. This concern, however, does not appear to sup-
ply an adequate unifying principle. At most it explains the results in the
Marchetti cases: when a statutory scheme makes it logically impossible
for an individual to assert the privilege without thereby incriminating
himself, the claim need not be presented. But this rationale alone does
not explain the result in Sullivan or provide an analysis for other cases
which may fall between Sullivan and the Marchetti cases.
Justice Brennan, concurring in Marchetti and Grosso,93 advanced an
88. Id. at 50-51 (quoting United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 34 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
89. Kahriger was also overruled on grounds not relevant here. See 390 U.S. at 52-54; see
also supra note 36.
90. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 60-61; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67, 71; Haynes, 390 U.S. at 100;
Leary, 395 U.S. at 27.
91. See Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79.
92. 390 U.S. at 50 (quoting United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 34 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
93. 390 U.S. 62, 72 (1968) (Brennan, J., concurring).
alternate principle, that a statute violates the privilege when it "clearly
evidences the purpose of gathering information from citizens in order to
secure their conviction of crime."94 This principle also appears ill-suited
to serve as a general rule in these cases.95 First, by focusing on statutory
purpose, it would require an inquiry into the apparent purposes of each
statute examined-an uncertain task at best. More fundamentally, such
an inquiry would seem to disregard the essence of a claim of the privi-
lege: whether the government has compelled self-incrimination. This de-
termination should turn on the effect of a statute rather than on its
purposes.96
B. Implications of the Marchetti Cases
In the Marchetti cases, the Court took drastic measures to protect
the policies underlying the privilege against self-incrimination, including
overruling its sixteen-year-old decision in Kahriger and its more recent
decision in Lewis v. United States.97 The Court's rejection of Kahriger
rested in part on its rejection of Kahriger's rote application of Sullivan to
defeat the privilege without any consideration of the merits of the
claim.98 The Court also apparently limited the scope of the Sullivan rule,
extending the protection of the privilege to four individuals who had
never submitted required information and had not raised the privilege
until their prosecutions. More importantly, the Court found that the
claimants had properly asserted the privilege in the circumstances of each
case.
99
The Marchetti cases contain a common fact pattern. Each of the
statutes was tailored so that the requirement to register or to report fell
exclusively on a class composed largely of persons threatened with crimi-
nal liability under some other law."°° As the Court emphasized in
94. 390 U.S. at 73.
95. But cf text accompanying notes 139-142, where the governmental purpose is consid-
ered as an element of the government's informational interest.
96. Justice Harlan's opinions in Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes concentrate on the incrim-
inatory effect of the statutory schemes, to the exclusion of the legislative purpose. See
Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 42-48; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64-65; Haynes, 390 U.S. at 87-90, 95-97.
97. 348 U.S. 419 (1955); see supra note 36.
98. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 50; see also supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
99. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 60; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67; Haynes, 390 U.S. at 100; Leary, 395
U.S. at 29.
100. The privilege does not protect against the compulsion inherent in the legal obligation
to do an act; it generally protects only against the dilemma posed by a compulsion to perform
an act when performing that act would create a risk of prosecution for a separate criminal
offense. For instance, in Marchetti the privilege protected against the dilemma of risking pros-
ecution for failure to file the wagering tax return or of risking prosecution for illegal gambling
activities on filing the return. 390 U.S. at 48-49. By contrast, in United States v. Toussie, 410
F.2d 1156, 1159-60 (2d Cir. 1969), the privilege did not protect the defendant from prosecu-
tion for failure to register for the selective service when registration did not entail a risk of
prosecution for any other criminal offense. See Comment, Conditioning FinancialAid on Draft
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Haynes, the classes were not composed entirely of likely criminals; 1 ' it
sufficed that the class was a" 'selective group inherently suspect of crimi-
nal activities.' "102 In these circumstances, the Court found a legally en-
forced reporting requirement to constitute compelled self-incrimination.
This determination followed from a chain of inferences based on two
assumptions: (1) only persons required to file the reports would in fact
file, and (2) persons reporting that they are members of a criminally sus-
pect class are incriminated.103 The assumptions in this reasoning appear
to be sound. The first assumption would be false if a person to whom a
reporting requirement did not apply voluntarily filed a report. This is
not likely to occur, especially in the context of the statutes at issue in the
Marchetti decisions, because no reasonable person would voluntarily file,
for example, a wagering tax return. The second assumption derives from
the traditional criterion of what constitutes "incrimination." Information
is incriminating if it is "available to prosecuting authorities"'" and
would "prove a significant 'link in a chain' of evidence tending to estab-
lish ... guilt.11
0 5
Two other aspects of the Court's analysis are significant. First, the
Court's reasoning does not rely on the fact that the Marchetti cases in-
volved uses of the taxing power. This suggests that the reasoning in the
Marchetti cases should apply equally to tax and nontax cases. Indeed,
the antecedent of these decisions, Albertson,106 involved a statute provid-
ing for national security.107 Second, the Marchetti analysis does not re-
quire a claimant to show that compliance necessarily will identify him as
having engaged in criminal activities. The analysis requires the claimant
Registration: A Bill of Attainder and Fifth Amendment Analysis, 84 COLUM. L. Rv. 775, 796
n.143 (1984).
101. 390 U.S. at 96-97.
102. Leary, 395 U.S. at 18.
103. Justice Harlan's reasoning in the Marchetti cases was as follows. First, assuming that
any compliance with a mandatory reporting requirement necessarily implies that the person
reporting is a member of the class required to report, once it has been determined that a
particular report is required only of a criminally suspect class, then any compliance with the
reporting requirement necessarily implies that the person reporting is a member of a criminally
suspect class. Second, assuming that any person who must report that he is a member of a
criminally suspect class is incriminated, if the person reporting is a member of a criminally
suspect class, then the person reporting is incriminated. The reasoning is set out in Leary, 395
U.S. at 18.
104. See 390 U.S. at 48-49.
105. Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting a metaphor used by Chief Justice Marshall in United
States v. Burr, In re Willie, 25 F. Cas. 38,40 (D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692e)). See also Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) ("The Privilege ... extends to answers ... which
would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal
crime.").
106. 382 U.S. 70 (1965), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 50-62.
107. 50 U.S.C.A. § 787(a), (c) (1951), repealed by Pub. L. No. 90-237, § 5, 81 Stat. 766
(1968).
only to show that he is a member of a criminally suspect class.10 8 For a
class to be "criminally suspect" it is necessary that a significant number
of persons in the class have violated the law, but this does not require
that every member of the class, including the claimant, be a criminal. 10 9
C. Articulating the Substantive View
1. The Policy of the Privilege
A comparison of Sullivan with the Marchetti cases reveals a signifi-
cant difference that relates to the strength, or clarity, of the incriminating
inferences created by compliance with the reporting requirements. If
Sullivan had complied with Justice Holmes' requirement of asserting the
privilege in response to particular inquiries on the income tax return and
then submitting it to the government, he would have incriminated him-
self to some extent.110 One may reasonably have inferred that Sullivan
feared exposure to criminal liability if he accurately responded to a ques-
tion rather than assert the privilege. Yet, in light of the Sullivan deci-
sion, this inference must be constitutionally permissible.
The difference between the incriminating inferences in Sullivan and
in the Marchetti cases seems to be one of degree: the inferences are much
stronger in the Marchetti cases. Justice Brennan in Albertson anticipated
the distinction:
In Sullivan the questions in the income tax return were neutral on
their face and directed at the public at large, but here they are
directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal
activities. Petitioners' claims are not asserted in an essentially non-
criminal and regulatory area of inquiry, but against an inquiry in
an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of
the form's questions in context might involve the petitioners in the
admission of a crucial element of a crime.111
A person's claim of the privilege in response to an inquiry into his
occupation ordinarily implies nothing more than his awareness of the
incriminating tendency of the true response.11 2 Although this may attract
a prosecutor's attention, perhaps leading to an investigation for possible
criminal activity, the inference does not incriminate the claimant with
particularity: it does not reveal him to be a drug dealer, a gambler, or a
108. See Leary, 395 U.S. at 18.
109. This consequence is not surprising because the privilege has often been described as a
protection to the innocent as well as a shelter to the guilty. See, eg., Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955). The
privilege against self-incrimination guards against the risk of criminal prosecution, not the risk
of a guilty verdict.
110. Mansfield, supra note 2, at 117.
111. 382 U.S. at 79.
112. The inference arises from the fact that a claim of the privilege lies only when the true
response would tend to be incriminating.
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thief. The burden of unearthing criminal facts, if any exist, rests entirely
with the prosecutor. The privilege protects the taxpayer against use of
the claim on the return as evidence at trial, but it has never extended to
prevent a prosecutor from drawing the incriminating inference that fol-
lows naturally from the assertion of the privilege.1 1 3 Thus, the taxpayer
in the Sullivan situation must incriminate himself only to the extent of
providing the government a possible clue to his activities.
By contrast, the taxpayer who merely puts his name on one of the
forms involved in Albertson or the Marchetti cases-regardless of
whether he provides any other information or asserts the privilege
against self-incrimination-necessarily identifies himself as a member of
a targeted, criminally suspect class. More than drawing a prosecutor's
attention, such an identification significantly eases the prosecutorial bur-
den. The investigation becomes, for example, whether the taxpayer is an
illegal gambler, not whether he is a gambler at all. Furthermore, even if
the report carries a claim of the privilege on its face, a prosecutor could
discard the portion of the report containing the claim and submit the
remainder in evidence. Presumably, the fact that the individual placed
his name on a form directed at a criminally suspect class would create a
permissible evidentiary inference of guilt." 4 The fact that the taxpayer
provided his name on the form without asserting the privilege, thus los-
ing or waiving the privilege as to this information, may refute any argu-
ment that the return is used in derogation of the assertion of the
privilege.1 5 In this sense the person in the Marchetti dilemma risks a
more injurious and conclusive incriminating inference than in Sullivan.
The strength of the incriminating inference became a focal point of
the Court's analysis in California v. Byers,1 1 6 decided three years after
Marchetti. Byers was convicted of violating California's "hit and run"
statute, which required drivers of automobiles involved in traffic acci-
dents causing property damage to stop and identify themselves to the
owner of the damaged property. 1 7 Byers refused to stop after he was in
an accident and then claimed the privilege as a defense in his prosecution
under the statute. The Court reversed the California Supreme Court and
held that Byers' prosecution did not violate his privilege against self-
incrimination.1
113. See, e.g., Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 104 S. Ct.
3348, 3366 n.18 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Of course, the Government can always
draw an incriminating inference when a person claims a Fifth Amendment privilege.").
114. See Mansfield, supra note 2, at 117.
115. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 650 (1976).
116. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
117. CAL. VEH. CODE § 20002(a)(1) (West 1986). Violations of this section carried a pun-
ishment of up to six months imprisonment and a fine of up to $500. Byers, 402 U.S. at 426 n.1.
118. 402 U.S. at 427 (plurality opinion); 402 U.S. at 458 (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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Chief Justice Burger, writing for four justices, concluded that Cali-
fornia's reporting requirement did not create a substantial inference of
criminal liability."1 9 He reasoned that the statute applied to "all persons
who drive automobiles in California, '  a class that is not "either
'highly selective' or 'inherently suspect of criminal activities.' "121 Be-
cause there was no substantial incriminating inference, the statute did
not implicate the privilege.
The five other members of the Byers Court disagreed with the plu-
rality and concluded that the hit and run statute created a substantial
incriminating inference. Justice Harlan viewed this issue not as whether
Byers was a member of an " 'inherently-suspect-class' ";122 that label was
relevant only "as an indicium of genuine incriminating risk."12 Instead,
the inquiry was whether compliance with the statute would create an
incriminating inference of criminal liability. Justice Harlan agreed with
the California Supreme Court that the reporting requirement was incrim-
inating: "[T]he widespread prevalence of criminal sanctions as a means
of regulating driving [casts] a substantial shadow of suspicion over the
class." '124 Justice Harlan joined in the plurality's judgment, however, be-
cause he concluded that the state's legitimate interests outweighed the
risk of incrimination created by the statute.
125
Justices Black and Brennan ified dissenting opinions in which they
echoed Justice Harlan's analysis of the incriminating inference. Both jus-
tices argued that the relevant class created under the statute was not, as
the plurality claimed, the class of automobile drivers in California. The
correct class was composed of California drivers involved in accidents
causing property damage. 126 According to Justice Black, individuals in
this class are "very likely to have violated one of the hundreds of state
criminal statutes regulating automobiles which constitute most of two
119. 402 U.S. at 431 ("[D]isclosures with respect to automobile accidents simply do not
entail the kind of substantial risk of self-incrimination involved in Marchetti, Grosso, and
Haynes."). Chief Justice Burger also based his decision on the alternative ground that the
statute's requirement that drivers stop at the scene of an accident was "nontestimonial" and
was not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 432-33; see generally
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (privilege does not prevent use of compelled
nontestimonial disclosures). This alternative basis for the plurality opinion was soundly re-
jected by a majority of the Court in Byers. 402 U.S. at 435-36 (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgment); 402 U.S. at 462-63 (Black, J., joined by Douglas and Brennan, JJ., dissenting); 402
U.S. at 472-73 (Brennan, 3., joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
120. 402 U.S. at 430.
121. Id. at 431. Chief Justice Burger added that "No empirical data are suggested in sup-
port of the conclusion that there is a relevant correlation between being a driver and criminal
prosecution of drivers." Id
122. 402 U.S. at 438 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 448-58. See infra notes 151-161 and accompanying text.
126. 402 U.S. at 461 (Black, J., dissenting); 402 U.S. at 470 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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volumes of the California Code."
127
Justice Brennan objected to the plurality's "misunderstanding""12 of
the inherently suspect class language:
The plurality seems to believe that membership in such a suspect
group is somehow an indispensable foundation for any Fifth
Amendment claim. Of course, this is not so, unless the plurality is
now prepared to assume that [past self-incrimination decisions by
the Court] were based . . . upon the unarticulated premises that
bankrupts, businessmen, policemen, and lawyers are all "group[s]
inherently suspect of criminal activities."
1 29
Instead, Justice Brennan drew on Albertson and Marchetti to argue that
the relevant inquiry was whether identifying California drivers involved
in accidents causing property damage would create an inference of crimi-
nal liability. 3 ° In Justice Brennan's view, the state's interests in the hit
and run statute did not justify the strong incriminating inference created
by the reporting requirement.131
2. The Government's Informational Interest
Another distinction between Sullivan and the Marchetti cases is the
nature of the governmental information interest in each case. This dis-
tinction provided the basis for Justice Brennan's concurrences in
Marchetti and Grosso I 2 and, three years later, in Mackey v. United
States. 3' In the Marchetti cases Justice Brennan asserted that the deci-
sions did not imperil legitimate governmental interests in obtaining infor-
mation. "The privilege against self-incrimination does not bar the
Government from establishing every program or scheme featured by pro-
visions designed to secure information from citizens to accomplish
proper legislative purposes." '13 4 Sullivan provided an example of a legiti-
mate governmental program serving legitimate interests.1 35 Albertson,
Marchetti, and Grosso, however, were examples of governmental schemes
created for "the purpose of gathering information from citizens in order
to secure their conviction of crime."
1 36
Justice Brennan's concern for the governmental interests implicated
by a claim of the privilege is most evident in Mackey. Mackey was con-
victed of income tax evasion, partly on evidence of the income statement
127. 402 U.S. at 460 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
128. 402 U.S. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 469-70.
131. Id. at 476.
132. 390 U.S. 62, 72 (Brennan, J., concurring).
133. 401 U.S. 667, 702 (1971) (Brennan, J., with whom Marshall, J., joined, concurring in
the judgment).
134. 390 U.S. at 72.
135. Id. at 73.
136. Id.
contained in his federal wagering tax return. His conviction became final
before the Marchetti cases were decided. The Court rejected his argu-
ment that the wagering return had been erroneously received in evidence
because under Marchetti and Grosso it constituted compelled self-incrimi-
nation. Seven justices found the dispositive issue to be whether Marchetti
applied retroactively to Mackey;'37 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Marshall, found that Marchetti did not even apply to Mackey's claim.
138
Central to Justice Brennan's analysis was the premise that the wa-
gering tax served "dual" purposes: the prosecutorial purpose of exposing
illegal gambling and the taxing purpose of raising revenue.139 The reve-
nue interest was a legitimate purpose in light of the privilege:
[WIhile the Government may not undertake the prosecution of
crime by inquiring of individuals what criminal acts they have
lately planned or committed, it may surround a taxing or regula-
tory scheme with reporting requirements designed to insure com-
pliance with the scheme .... In the latter situation, the privilege
may not be claimed if the danger of incrimination is only that the
information required may show a violation of the taxing or regula-
tory scheme.vat
The wagering return, by requiring a supplemental reporting of in-
come, 14 1 served the important interests of the federal income tax system:
"[H]ere the Government was entitled to demand the information that
petitioner supplied-his gross income from wagering-in order to en-
force the tax laws."' 42 In addition, the prosecutorial purpose condemned
in the Marchetti cases did not taint Mackey. The prosecution in Mackey
was for violation of the federal income tax laws, not for violation of the
wagering tax laws. 1
43
The Court's decision in California v. Byers'" demonstrates the role
of the affected governmental interests in the substantive analysis of the
presentation requirement. All but one justice considered the state's inter-
ests as a factor in the self-incrimination analysis."4 Although the plural-
137. 401 U.S. at 667-75 (plurality opinion); id. at 675-702 (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 713-14 (Douglas, J., with whom Black, J., concurred, dissenting).
138. Id. at 709.
139. Id. at 707.
140. Id. at 707-08 (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 710.
142. Id. at 711.
143. Id. at 710.
144. 402 U.S. 424 (1971); see supra notes 116-131 and accompanying text.
145. Justice Black was the only member of the Byers Court to reject any consideration of
the weight of the governmental interests in determining whether the privilege protected Byers
from complying with California's hit and run law. 402 U.S. at 459 (Black, J., dissenting).
Justice Black feared that a balancing analysis would inevitably dilute the protection of the
privilege. Id. at 463.
California's asserted interests in Byers were its interests (1) in deterring antisocial behav-
ior by criminal sanctions, 402 U.S. at 451 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment), (2) in
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ity ruled that California's hit and run statute did not implicate the
privilege against self-incrimination,146 it also weighed the governmental
interests against the interests of the privilege.147
Justices Brennan and Harlan clearly weighed the state's interests
against the policies of the privilege, but they came to opposite conclu-
sions regarding the proper result of the analysis. Justice Brennan bal-
anced what he perceived to be the strong inference of criminal liability14
against the state's interest in criminal law enforcement and its legitimate
but weak interest in providing "information 'sought by a private party
wholly for purposes of resolving a private dispute.' "149 California's non-
criminal interests with respect to the hit and run statute were, according
to Justice Brennan, no different from the state's interests in pretrial dis-
covery in the ordinary civil context.15 He did not recognize an independ-
ent state interest in maintaining a system of personal financial
responsibility as part of its regulation of driving. In Justice Brennan's
view, California's interests did not justify the incrimination required by
the statute.
Justice Harlan, however, concurred in the plurality's judgment pre-
cisely because the state's interests outweighed the implicated policies of
the privilege. In a clear enunciation of the substantive view, Justice
Harlan stated:
The question whether some sort of immunity is required as a con-
dition of compelled self-reporting inescapably requires an evalua-
tion of the assertedly noncriminal governmental purpose in
securing the information, the necessity for self-reporting as a
means of securing the information, and the nature of the disclo-
sures required.'-"
Justice Harlan's analysis considered separately the state's interest in
enforcing its criminal laws against illegal driving,152 its interest in main-
taining a system of personal financial responsibility for automobile acci-
dents,15 3 and the necessity of self-reporting in effecting both interests.
15 4
Although the state's criminal law enforcement interest generally should
maintaining a system of personal financial responsibility for automobile accidents, id. at 448,
and (3) in using self-reporting to enforce the system of personal financial responsibility. Id
146. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
147. 402 U.S. at 431 (plurality opinion) ("Furthermore, the statutory purpose is noncrimi-
nal and self-reporting is indispensable to its fulfillment.").
148. 402 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It is hard to imagine a record demonstrat-
ing a more substantial hazard of self-incrimination than this.").
149. Id. at 476 (quoting 402 U.S. at 450 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 454 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Mansfield, supra note 2, at
128-60).
152. 402 U.S. at 454.
153. Id. at 448.
154. Id.
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not weigh heavily against the privilege,155 Justice Harlan viewed this in-
terest as "significantly served by imposition of criminal sanctions in the
very cases where the feared results of dangerous driving have actually
materialized." '156 California's regulatory interest in its system of personal
financial responsibility for automobile accidents also weighed heavily. 57
Moreover, the use of self-reporting was almost indispensable to imple-
menting both interests. 5
Against these state interests Justice Harlan considered the impli-
cated self-incrimination interests. Although the privilege was clearly im-
plicated by the hit and run statute, 159 the intrusion did not violate the
privilege to the extent that the schemes in Marchetti and Grosso had.
1 60
In these circumstances Justice Harlan concluded that
[I]t [does] not follow that the constitutional values protected by the
[policies of the privilege] are of such overriding significance that
they compel substantial sacrifices in the efficient pursuit of other
governmental objectives in all situations where the pursuit of those
objectives requires the disclosure of information which will un-
doubtedly significantly aid in criminal law enforcement.
1 61
The validity of a claim of the privilege should not rest solely on the
importance of the affected governmental interest. Such a principle, taken
to its logical extreme, would destroy the privilege completely.1 62 Yet
there is strong appeal in the notion that government should have the
155. See Grosso, 390 U.S. 72, 73 (1968) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[W]e know that where
the governmental scheme clearly evidences the purpose of gathering information from citizens
in order to secure their conviction of crime, it contravenes the privilege.").
156. 402 U.S. at 447-48 (Harlan, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 440.
158. "[C]ompelled self-reporting is a necessary part of an effective scheme of assuring per-
sonal financial responsibility for automobile accidents. Undoubtedly, it can be argued that
self-reporting is at least as necessary to an effective scheme of criminal law enforcement in this
area." Id. at 448.
159. Id. at 450-51.
160. Id. at 457-58:
California's decision to compel Byers to stop after his accident and identify himself
will not relieve the State of the duty to determine, entirely by virtue of its own inves-
tigation after the coerced stop, whether or not any aspect of Byers' behavior was
criminal. Nor will it relieve the State of the duty to determine whether the accident
which Byers was forced to admit involvement in was proximately related to the as-
pect of his driving behavior thought to be criminal. In short, Byers having once
focused attention on himself as an accident participant, the State must still bear the
burden of making the main evidentiary case against Byers as a violator of ... the
California Vehicle Code. To characterize this burden as a merely ritualistic confir-
mation of the "conviction" secured through compliance with the reporting require-
ment in issue would be a gross distortion of reality; on the other hand, that
characterization of the evidentiary burden remaining on the State and Federal Gov-
ernments after compliance with the regulatory scheme involved in Marchetti and
Grosso seems proper.
(footnotes omitted).
161. Id. at 448.
162. See Mansfield, supra note 2, at 148-49.
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right to compel even self-incriminatory information to aid it in attaining
nonprosecutorial ends.1 63 Every successful assertion of the privilege frus-
trates some governmental information goal; the more important the frus-
trated interest, the more difficult it is to justify the loss of the information
because of the claim of privilege. Accordingly, an analysis and apprecia-
tion of the threatened governmental interest appears to lie at the core of
any decision to permit a claim of the privilege."
III. The Reemergence of the Procedural View
A. Garner v. United States
In the six years between Leary and the 1975 Term, the composition
of the Court changed dramatically. 165 In Garner v. United States, 166 it
became apparent that the Court's approach to the Sullivan presentation
rule had changed also. Garner sought reversal of his federal conviction
for conspiracy to fix horse races and to engage in illegal gambling. The
government's evidence at trial included several of Garner's federal in-
come tax returns, which listed his occupation as "professional gam-
bler."1 67 He did not assert the privilege against use of this information
until trial. The Court held that Garner, by voluntarily disclosing infor-
mation in the return when he could have claimed the privilege, had not
been compelled to incriminate himself.168 Relying on Mackey, Garner
argued that his fifth amendment objection at trial was sufficient to pre-
serve the privilege even though he had not claimed it in the return. 169 In
rejecting this argument, the Court took the opportunity to address the
tangential issue of the presentation requirement in the Marchetti cases.
The Court first noted the general proposition that a witness loses the
privilege against self-incrimination if he discloses information in his testi-
mony instead of claiming the privilege. 170 Compulsion by subpoena to
testify as a witness does not constitute prohibited compulsion under the
Fifth Amendment; accordingly, testimonial disclosures are viewed as
"voluntary."'' The Court then assumed that "[t]he information re-
vealed in the preparation and filing of an income tax return is, for pur-
163. See id. at 146.
164. See id. at 146-51.
165. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens had re-
placed Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan, and Fortas.
166. 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
167. Id. at 649-50.
168. Id. at 665.
169. Id. at 658-59.
170. Id. at 653-54.
171. Id. at 654. The Court drew on its statement that "[t]he Amendment speaks of com-
pulsion. It does not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in matters which may in-
criminate him." United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943).
poses of Fifth Amendment analysis, the testimony of a 'witness.' "172
Against this background, the Court turned in a footnote to the presenta-
tion requirement:
[T]he privilege is an exception to the general principle that the
Government has the right to everyone's testimony. A corollary to
that principle is that the claim of privilege ordinarily must be
presented to a "tribunal" for evaluation at the time disclosures are
initially sought. .... This early evaluation of claims allows the
Government to compel evidence if the claim is invalid or if immu-
nity is granted and therefore assures that the Government obtains
all the information to which it is entitled.
173
For the first time the Court offered a rationale for the Sullivan pres-
entation requirement. The importance of the government's informa-
tional interest requires that it receive all the information it is due, except
that which the privilege encompasses. The presentation requirement
serves this end by enabling the government to establish the validity of
any claim and to decide whether to extend immunity to the claimant in
order to obtain information over a valid assertion.' 74 This rationale also
derives support from the parties' relative abilities to know whether a re-
sponse may incriminate. Ordinarily "[o]nly the witness knows whether
the apparently innocent disclosure sought may incriminate him, and the
burden appropriately lies with him to make a timely assertion of the
privilege.'
175
The Garner Court next offered an explanation for the Marchetti
cases. Because presentation of the claim there would have itself incrimi-
nated the claimants, "[t]he Court therefore forgave the usual require-
ment that the claim of privilege be presented for evaluation in favor of a
'claim' by silence."' 176 The Court then concluded that Garner did not
come within the scope of the Marchetti cases: "Garner is differently situ-
ated. Although he disclosed himself to be a gambler, federal income tax
returns are not directed at those '"inherently suspect of criminal activi-
ties."' . . . The requirement that such returns be completed and filed
simply does not involve the compulsion to incriminate ....1,177
The Court's reasoning in Garner reveals a procedural approach to
the presentation issue. The privilege is properly asserted only if the claim
was presented for evaluation when disclosure was sought. This require-
ment is "forgiven" in a particular class of cases in which presentation
172. 424 U.S. at 656.
173. Id. at 658 n.l 1 (citations omitted).
174. The federal government may grant immunity from prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
§ 6002 (1982).
175. 424 U.S. at 655.
176. Id. at 658 n. 11. The claim, however, still must be valid. If it is found that the privilege
does not protect against the disclosures sought, the government may compel the information.
Id.
177. Id. at 660-61 (quoting Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 52 (1968)).
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itself incriminates the claimant. Because Garner did not fall into the ex-
cepted class, he failed to satisfy the presentation requirement. The Court
did not consider that some larger rationalizing principle underlies the
Marchetti cases and may apply also in Garner. Instead, the Court read
the Marchetti decisions as constituting a narrow, factually based excep-
tion to the general rule requiring presentation.
B. Minnesota v. Murphy
In the 1983 Term, the Court addressed the presentation requirement
twice. In Minnesota v. Murphy, 78 the defendant had been suspected of a
murder, but was never charged. Later, after conviction for a different
crime, he confessed to his parole officer that he had committed the mur-
der. He did not assert the privilege against self-incrimination until trial.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed Murphy's murder conviction on
the basis of Miranda v. Arizona 179 because the probation officer had
failed to inform Murphy of his right to claim the privilege.18 0 The Court
reversed, finding Murphy's claim to be outside the three "well-defined"
situations,181 including the Marchetti decisions, in which the privilege
protects an individual despite his failure to assert it when incriminating
disclosures are made.
182
The Court addressed the Marchetti cases in dicta. Murphy could
not claim the benefit of the claim by silence because, unlike the taxpayer
who "necessarily identifies himself as a gambler"' 183 by presenting a claim
of privilege in a wagering tax return, Murphy's identity as a murder sus-
pect was known to the authorities before the inquiries were made. Thus,
Murphy would not have exposed himself by claiming the privilege.'
84
Murphy strongly affirmed Garner and the procedural view in presen-
tation cases. The Marchetti cases were relevant to the Court's analysis
only insofar as they represented an exception to "the requirement that
the claim be presented for evaluation in a timely manner."'18 5 These
cases stood for the proposition that "the privilege may be exercised by
178. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
179. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
180. 465 U.S. at 425.
181. Id. at 429.
182. Id. at 429-40. The other situations were the custodial interrogation cases, see, e.g.,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and the economic coercion cases, see, e.g., Garrity v.
New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
183. 465 U.S. at 439. This statement might be construed to characterize the Marchetti
analysis as requiring a necessary implication of criminal activities by the claimant. This, how-
ever, would be a serious misinterpretation of the Marchetti analysis, which requires only an
implication of membership in a class of persons highly suspect of criminal activites. See supra
text accompanying notes 108-109.
184. Id.
185. Id. (footnote omitted).
CLAIM BY SILENCE
failing to file"' 86 required reports when the filing itself would be
incriminating. 87
C. Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group
In Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research
Group,'8 the Court reversed a district court's holding 89 that the privi-
lege prevented Congress from conditioning eligibility for federal post-
secondary student financial aid on the aid applicant's having certified his
draft registration status.' 90 In order to encourage compliance with the
draft registration law, Congress enacted section 1113 of the Department
of Defense Authorization Act of 1983,'19 which required college and
graduate student financial aid applicants to declare whether they had
registered, or, if they were exempt from registration, to specify the appli-
cable exemption. An application would be considered for aid only if the
certification were completed. 192 By conditioning aid eligibility on certifi-
cation, section 1113 provided an incentive to register for the draft. Sec-
tion 1113 did not differentiate between timely and untimely registration,
despite the fact that the presidential proclamation imposing registration
186. Id.
187. The Court supported this procedural approach by relying on its footnote in Garner,
which defined the procedural view: "[M]aking a claim of privilege when the disclosures were
requested, Le., when the returns were due, would have identified the claimant as a gambler.
The Court therefore forgave the usual requirement that the claim of privilege be presented for
evaluation in favor of a 'claim' by silence .... If a particular gambler would not have incrimi-
nated himself by filing the tax returns, the privilege would not justify a failure to file." Minne-
sota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 439 (quoting Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 658 n. 11
(1976)).
In describing the doctrine of the claim by silence, the Murphy Court apparently misstated
the circumstances giving rise to the Marchetti decisions. It stated: "In recognition of the
pervasive criminal regulation of gambling activities and the fact that claiming the privilege in
lieu offiling a return would tend to incriminate, the Court has held that the privilege may be
exercised by failing to file." Id. (citing Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso
v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968)) (emphasis supplied). Marchetti and Grosso, however,
were manifestly not situations in which the government argued that the petitioners should
have claimed the privilege in lieu of filing the return; rather, the government contended that
the privilege should be asserted in the return itself. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 50-54; Grosso, 390
U.S. at 64-67. See United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 264 (defendant "should have tested
[the claim of privilege] in the return so that it could be passed upon."). See also Kahriger, 345
U.S. at 32. Reliance on this misstatement could have the deleterious effect of confusing the
Marchetti analysis. That analysis presumes that the alternative to failure to fie is claiming the
privilege in the return itself. See, e.g., Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 263. It is the connection between
the assertion of the privilege and the report that creates incrimination in the Marchetti
analysis.
188. 104 S. Ct. 3348 (1984).
189. Doe v. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F. Supp. 937 (D. Minn. 1983).
190. The aid program exists under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, codified
at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070-89 (1982).
191. Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(f) (1982).
192. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.25 (1983).
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required men to register within thirty days of their eighteenth birthday,
and late registration carried criminal penalties.193 Thus, section 1113
urged even untimely registration.
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota en-
joined the Selective Service System from enforcing the statute, holding
that the plaintiffs94 had demonstrated a strong probability that they
would succeed on the merits in their bill of attainder and fifth amend-
ment challenges to section 1113.195 The court held that section 1113
probably violated the privilege against self-incrimination because it
forced nonregistrants to
identify themselves in the... aid application process as nonregis-
trants under the Selective Service System's registration require-
ments. The law allows this information to be provided to the
Director of the Selective Service System and directs that the Direc-
tor work with the Secretary of Education to verify compliance
statements.... [I]t appears that the Service expects to implement
soon an "active" enforcement program based on access to Social
Security records.... It takes no great stretch of the imagination to
discern how plaintiffs' identification of themselves as nonregis-
trants could incriminate them or provide a significant link in the
193. Presidential Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. 82 (1982).
194. The plaintiffs sued under the fictious names of John Doe, Richard Roe, Paul Poe,
Bradley Boe, Carl Coe and Frank Foe. Each was a male resident of Minnesota between the
ages of nineteen and twenty-one who (1) intended to apply for federal postsecondary financial
aid, (2) could not complete his education without financial aid, and (3) could not comply
truthfully with the certification requirement under Section 1113. Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 938.
Doe, Roe and Poe had intervened in an action filed originally by the Minnesota Public Interest
Research Group (MPIRG), which was a Minnesota nonprofit corporation directed by stu-
dents. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F. Supp. 923 (D.
Minn. 1983). The court had granted summary judgment against MPIRG on the ground that it
lacked standing. 557 F. Supp. at 925. The court then informally consolidated the two actions
for decision on the motion for preliminary injunction. Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 938; see also
Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3352.
195. The court entered a preliminary injunction on March 10, 1983. The injunction was
made permanent on June 16, 1983. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3352. The Supreme
Court stayed the injunction pending appeal on June 29, 1983. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Doe, 463
U.S. 1215 (1983).
On the bill of attainder analysis, the district court found that Section 1113 singled out an
identifiable group based on past conduct-failure to register, legislatively determined their
guilt, and punished them by denying them financial aid, which deprived them of the practical
means to pursue their educations. Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 942-46. On appeal the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that Section 1113 did not constitute a Bill of Attainder, because properly
construed, it did not specify an ascertainable group, and it was not punitive in nature. 104 S.
Ct. at 3353-58. For analysis of the bill of attainder issue in Selective Sery. Sys., see Comment,
Conditioning Financial Aid on Draft Registration: A Bill of Attainder and Fifth Amendment
Analysis, 84 COLUM. L. Rnv. 775, 776-95 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Conditioning Financial
Aid]; Comment, Doe v. Selective Service System: The Constitutionality of Conditioning Student
Financial Assistance on Draft Registration, 68 MINN. L. REV. 677, 680-702 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Constitutionality].
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chain of evidence tending to establish their guilt.
19 6
The Supreme Court restricted its review to determining whether
conditioning aid eligibility on draft registration certification constituted
impermissible compulsion" 7 and whether the nonregistrants, who had
never presented a claim of privilege to the government, had properly as-
serted the privilege.198 Only the latter issue, by possibly requiring the
unmasking of anonymous, criminally liable persons, involved a Marchetti
question: presentation of a claim of privilege arguably could incriminate
a late registrant who sought to comply with the certification requirement.
Selective Service System contained two self-incrimination issues, one
relating to each of the government's required reports. The financial aid
application requested certification of the applicant's status as either regis-
tered for the draft or exempt from registration. The Court failed to con-
sider the aid application in its fifth amendment analysis. Because an
incomplete certification presumably would have rendered an applicant
ineligible for aid, arguably no one would file an application with an in-
complete certification. 199 Even if some persons were to file applications
with incomplete certifications, creating at least a slight inference of non-
registration, this incriminating inference would not rise to the level of the
inferences in the Marchetti cases. Here, persons required to file the certi-
fication were college and graduate students, a class of persons not highly
suspected of criminal activities. Thus, unlike the Marchetti decisions, the
mere applicability of the certification's, reporting requirement did not
identify an applicant as a member of a class of likely criminals. In dis-
sent, Justice Marshall confirmed the conclusion that the application was
nonincriminating: "[T]he Title IV application process itself does not re-
quire a student to divulge incriminating information .... The neutrality
of this compliance verification system is central to the majority's accept-
ance of the permissible, regulatory purpose of the statute.
' 200
The Court's fifth amendment analysis focused on the draft registra-
tion form itself. Assuming that conditioning financial aid eligibility com-
pelled registration," ' the registration form, which required a registrant
196. Doe 557 F. Supp. at 948 (footnote and citation omitted).
197. 104 S. Ct. at 3358. The Court stated that the economic coercion involved in condi-
tioning financial aid eligibility on draft registration did not constitute impermissible compul-
sion under the Fifth Amendment. Id. For a brief critique of this analysis, see infra note 201.
198. 104 S. Ct. at 3358-59.
199. The Court stated: "Since a nonregistrant is bound to know that his application for
federal aid would be denied, he is in no sense under any 'compulsion' to seek that aid. He has
no reason to make any statement to anyone as to whether or not he has registered." 104 S. Ct.
at 3358.
200. Selective Sery. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3363-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
201. The Court concluded that the conditional aid eligibility did not constitute compulsion
within the meaning of the privilege. 104 S. Ct. at 3358. This determination is debatable.
Compare Comment, Constitutionality, supra note 195, at 707-09 (denial of student aid is not
coercive because student can "escape" the sanction by registering and because any coercion
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to provide his name, birthdate and date of registration, 0 2 sought poten-
tially incriminating information that implicated the privilege. Each piece
of information was a crucial element in a prosecution for late registration
or nonregistration. °3
Because the registration form was directed exclusively at the class of
men required to register, any compliance with the registration form nec-
essarily would identify a person as a member of that class. This certainly
could be incriminating to late registrants or nonregistrants, especially be-
cause a primary problem in enforcing the draft registration law was de-
termining who was required to register.2" Claiming the privilege on the
registration form would identify the claimant as subject to the registra-
tion requirement and expose him to an increased risk of prosecution.
Like identification as a gambler, identification as a draft-age male signifi-
cantly eases the prosecutor's investigatory burden. The inquiry becomes
whether the identified person has registered within the prescribed time,
not whether he must register at all. Combined with the economic com-
pulsion of the threat to withhold financial aid, the draft registration stat-
ute implicated the interests protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination.
2 °5
An analyis under the substantive view would balance the substanti-
ality of the risk of incrimination agaifst the affected governmental inter-
ests. The government has an important, perhaps "compelling,"
20 6
interest in draft registration to meet the legitimate end of providing for
national security. The information requested by the registration form is
reasonably necessary to achieving this end. Weighing with the govern-
mental interest is the consideration that, although a claim of the privilege
would create an incriminating inference, the registration statute is funda-
mentally different from the statutory scheme in the Marchetti cases.
requires registration rather than revelation of noncompliance) with Comment, Conditioning
FinancialAid, supra note 195, at 799-800 ("denial of student aid clearly [constitutes] 'substan-
tial economic coercion' ").
202. 32 C.F.R. § 1615.4 (1983).
203. Prosecution under the Military Selective Service Act requires the government to prove
(1) the defendant's date of birth, (2) his failure to register within eighteen years and thirty days
of his date of birth, and (3) his knowledge of his duty to register. 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(a)
(1982). See Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3364 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The draft regis-
tration form itself provides the first two elements, leaving only the third element for the prose-
cution to show. Id. More importantly, however, the registration form identifies draft-age
males to the government, which overcomes the most difficult obstacle to enforcing registration.
Id. at 3366 n.18 ("[N]onregistrants are not known to the Government. Therefore, invocation
of the Fifth Amendment by appellees gives the Government a different quality of
information.").
204. Oversight Hearing on Selective Service Prosecutions Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1982).
205. See Comment, Conditioning Financial Aid, supra note 195, at 795-805.
206. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3360 (Powell, J., concurring).
Those statutes were designed to expose activity that was illegal under
state law. The draft registration statute, however, combined with the
financial aid certification, were designed to induce manifestly legal con-
duct-registration for the draft. To this extent the two arguably are dis-
tinguishable. This distinction, however, does not insulate Selective
Service System from the Marchetti analysis. First, the argument that the
aid certification compelled registration rather than exposure of likely
criminal conduct is simply misleading. For those who were exempt from
registration or who had fulfilled their duty to register, there was no risk
of incrimination. But for those who had not registered within thirty days
of their eighteenth birthday, the statute coerced a revelation of criminal
activity. Late registration was punished just as heavily as noncompliance
under the statute.20 7 Thus the registration statute fell squarely within the
ambit of the Marchetti cases. 20 8 Second, and more important, the
Marchetti analysis does not depend on the nature of the conduct com-
pelled; rather, it turns on the existence of an incriminating inference. If
the government coerces an individual to file a report in circumstances in
which a claim of the privilege would reveal the claimant to be a member
of a class of persons highly suspect of criminal activity, the Marchetti
analysis is fully applicable.
If the Court had used the substantive analysis of the claim by silence
in Selective Service System, the result could have gone either way. The
substantial risk of incrimination faced by late registrants may have been
offset by the government's concededly strong interest in draft registration
to provide for national security. The Supreme Court's ground for deci-
sion in Selective Service System was, however, unclear. With respect to
the claim of incrimination, the Court stated:
None of these appellees has registered and thus none of them
has been confronted with a need to assert a Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege ....
... Under these circumstances, section 1113 does not violate
their Fifth Amendment rights by forcing them to acknowledge
during the registration process they have avoided that they have
registered late.209
The Court may have conducted a ripeness analysis similar to that in
Communist Party, in which the Court ruled that because the litigants had
failed to satisfy every condition precedent to the existence of their duty to
207. 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(a) (1982).
208. See Selective Serv. Sy%, 104 S. Ct. at 3367 (Marshall, 3., dissenting) ("Congress forged
the link between education aid and Selective Service registration in order to bring into compli-
ance with the law the 674,000 existing nonregistrants .... Although as a general matter it is
correct to say that registration is like income tax .... Section 1113-compelled late registration
is directed to a group inherently suspect of criminal activity, squarely presenting a Marchetti
issue.").
209. 104 S. Ct. at 3358-59 (footnote omitted).
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register, no opportunity to claim the privilege arose. °10 The premise of
the ripeness analysis is that the duty to register does not apply. Here,
however, the draft registration obligation clearly fell on the appellees, so
a ripeness analysis would be misplaced. 11
Alternatively, the Court may have rested its decision on the ground
that the privilege was not properly asserted. The appellees had neither
presented their claim of the privilege to the government nor attempted
any compliance with the registration form. On this issue the Court re-
fused to find an exception to the presentation rule and apparently found
that, because the privilege was asserted improperly, section 1113 did not
violate the appellees' fifth amendment rights. In a footnote, the Court
distinguished the Marchetti cases on their facts: "In Marchetti and
Grosso, however, anyone who asserted the privilege on a wagering return
did not merely call attention to himself; the very filing necessarily admit-
ted illegal gambling activity."2 2 The appellees' self-incrimination claim
in Selective Service System may have failed under either the procedural or
the substantive view. Yet the Court appeared again to take the proce-
dural view, casting the Marchetti cases in Garner terms: "The dissent
reads [the Marchetti cases] to create in this case an exception to the nor-
mal rule requiring assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege."
21 3
Beyond its apparent affirmation of the procedural view, the Court in
Selective Service System appeared to read the Marchetti cases as requiring
a necessary admission of illegal activities before the exception lies to the
procedural rule.214 In the Marchetti cases, however, the incriminating
inference was not a necessary admission of illegal activities, but rather a
necessary inference of membership in a highly suspect class of persons.
The difference is significant because to require a necessary inference of
illegal activites would severely restrict the Marchetti analysis.
IV. A Comparison of the Substantive and Procedural Views
The Garner Court's characterization of the Marchetti cases as creat-
ing a "claim" of the privilege by silence suggests that it viewed those
cases as establishing an alternative manner of asserting the privilege. Yet
the proposition that the privilege can be asserted by silence suffers from
conceptual difficulties. By its nature silence is ambiguous.215 A person
may fail to file a required report for various reasons, which may not in-
clude a desire to avoid incrimination. For instance, the taxpayers in the
210. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
211. Each appellee was more than eighteen years and one month old. See supra note 194.
212. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3359 n.16.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Silence may be less ambiguous in the context of a duty to speak. See Greenawalt,
Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. RENv. 15 (1981).
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Marchetti cases may have wished to avoid paying taxes, rather than to
avoid incrimination. Other modes of asserting the privilege, such as Sul-
livan presentation, clearly reveal an intent to gain the benefits of the priv-
ilege. However, because it is never evident whether a person who
maintains silence intends to claim the privilege, it is misleading to ana-
lyze the Marchetti rule as a claim or affirmative assertion of the privilege.
The Marchetti Court did not view itself as inventing a new proce-
dural rule for asserting the privilege. Instead, it determined that assert-
ing the privilege was not necessary to obtain the protection of the Fifth
Amendment.2" 6 Indeed, the Court's concern in the Marchetti cases was
not with the procedural details involved in a proper claim of privilege,
but with the proper result in a prosecution for failure to undertake an
incriminating action.217 Accordingly, the Marchetti cases are instances
in which the Court conducted a substantive balancing judgment that
weighed in favor of extending the privilege to certain persons regardless
of whether they actually asserted it. In these cases, the privilege provides
a defense to the prosecutions. The defense applies whenever the impor-
tance of the particular governmental information interest cannot justify
the intrusion into the privilege. Assertion of a claim is not necessary to
obtain the benefit of the privilege when assertion itself involves substan-
tial risk of incrimination.
Analytically, the substantive view is preferable to the procedural
view because the substantive view balances the implicated governmental
interests directly against the privilege without the distraction of an irrele-
vant procedural consideration. The competing interests can be scruti-
nized fully in light of the facts of each case. The weights of the risk of
incrimination and of the governmental interests receive primary consid-
eration. These factors should govern specific applications of the privilege
and should not be buried beneath the bare formalism of the procedural
view when a presentation problem is at issue.
In addition, under the substantive view the scope of the privilege
assumes contours that vary according to the relative importance of the
governmental interests and the substantiality of incrimination in each
case. Although this result makes the application of the privilege more
complex, complexity may be a small price to pay to achieve a greater
216. The Marchetti Court stated: "In these circumstances, we cannot conclude that [peti-
tioner's] failure to assert the privilege to Treasury officials at the moment the tax payments
were due irretrievably abandoned his constitutional protection. Petitioner is under sentence
for violation of statutory requirements which he consistently asserted at and after trial to be
unconstitutional; no more can here be required." 390 U.S. at 50-51.
217. In Leary the Court stated: "The aspect of the self-incrimination privilege which was
involved in Marchetti, and which petitioner asserts here, is... the right not to be criminally
liable for one's previous failure to obey a statute which required an incriminatory act. Thus,
petitioner is ... asserting... that he cannot be convicted for having failed to comply with the
transfer provisions of the Act at the time he acquired marihuana in 1965." 395 U.S. at 28.
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rationality in self-incrimination jurisprudence. The privilege against self-
incrimination is a fundamentally complex principle. As Justice Harlan
observed:
The Constitution contains no formulae with which we can calcu-
late the areas within th[e] 'full scope' to which the privilege should
extend .... [T]he Court has chiefly derived its standards from
consideration of two factors: the history and purposes of the privi-
lege, and the character and urgency of other public interests
involved. 18
Whenever the government imposes a duty to disclose information
and permits an exception to the duty only when the disclosure may in-
criminate, the act of claiming the exception necessarily creates an incrim-
inating inference.219 Under the Supreme Court's decisions, an individual
ordinarily must incriminate himself to some extent by asserting the privi-
lege in order to gain its benefits.220 But at some point, merely claiming
the privilege gives rise to so substantial an incriminating inference that
affirmatively asserting the privilege becomes unnecessary. Any adequate
account of the privilege must provide an explanatory principle for this
phenomenon.
The procedural view presents a weak response to this problem. It
attempts to ground the claim by silence solely on the incriminating effect
of presentation in the Marchetti cases221 and denies the existence of the
risk of incrimination present in Sullivan.222 Nor can the procedural anal-
ysis adequately account for the different results in Sullivan and in the
Marchetti cases. Under the procedural view those cases are either distin-
guishable because presentation in Sullivan involved no incrimination,
which appears false, or they are simply inconsistent decisions. The sub-
stantive view encounters no such difficulty. It brings two additional con-
siderations to the analysis of the presentation issue: the government's
interest and the substantiality of the incriminating inference. These addi-
tional factors provide ample grounds for distinguishing Sullivan from
Marchetti223 and for responding to the larger problem of explaining the
permissible incrimination inherent in any presentation requirement relat-
ing to the privilege.
The substantive view is superior to the procedural view for addi-
tional reasons. In some cases the government's need for information may
218. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
219. See Mansfield, supra note 2, at 118.
220. Id. at 117.
221. The procedural view bases the Marchetti exception to the presentation requirement on
the reasoning that "[s]ince submitting a claim of privilege in lieu of the... [disclosure] would
incriminate. ... the privilege could be exercised by simply failing to file." Garner v. United
States, 424 U.S. 648, 658 (1976).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 20-25.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 110-164.
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be so great that otherwise impermissible compulsion of incriminating in-
formation becomes necessary." The substantive view could permit such
compulsion when the government's interests clearly justified it.22 By
contrast, the procedural view would prevent the government's use of a
reporting mechanism similar to those involved in the Marchetti
decisions.226
In addition, under the procedural view a person in a Marchetti situa-
tion need never present his claim of the privilege, even though presenta-
tion may lead to a grant of immunity from prosecution.227 Thus the
procedural view may unnecessarily deny important information to the
government. By comparison, under the substantive view, presentation of
the privilege is necessary even in a Marchetti case if the threatened gov-
ernmental interests are sufficiently compelling. Thus, the substantive
view of the presentation problem arguably makes more information
available to the government than the procedural view.
Further, the justifiable failure to make required disclosures not only
protects an individual from the threat of prosecution, but also shields
him from the civil, social and personal exposure that otherwise would
follow the disclosure.228 The privilege protects only against the threat of
criminal prosecution, with the result that it permits these additional
sanctions. Not even a grant of prosecutorial immunity shields a person
from these social pressures. Yet under the procedural view, the
Marchetti cases shield a protected individual from these concomitant
pressures by permitting him to remain silent. Thus no one knows of his
activities. Although this may be desirable public policy, it has never been
an aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Moreover, the substantive view appropriately accords the privilege
the stature of an express constitutional guarantee. The Fifth Amend-
ment contains no presentation requirement. Yet under the procedural
view, an individual's failure to meet the judicially created requirement of
presentation defeats the privilege even in cases in which the policy of the
privilege may be implicated most seriously, such as, for example, when
224. For instance, the government may require information during war time or times of
national crisis.
225. The idea that the privilege may be subordinated to an overwhelming governmental
interest is implicit in the balancing judgment conducted under the substantive view. See Cali-
fornia v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1971) (plurality opinion). However, as a practical matter,
given the availability of a grant of immunity from prosecution, 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982), the
situation in which the government's compelling interest may require overriding of the privilege
probably will never arise.
226. Moreover, the reasoning of the procedural view forecloses any argument that an indi-
vidual's failure to comply with the reporting requirement did not constitute an attempt to
invoke the privilege: the procedural view attributes a specific anti-incriminatory intent to indi-
viduals who fail to submit required information.
227. See Garner, 424 U.S. at 658 n. 11, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 173-174.
228. Mansfield, supra note 2, at 107.
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skillfully drawn legislation requires a select group to disclose incriminat-
ing information. By dispensing with procedural prerequisites, the sub-
stantive view fully recognizes the constitutional weight of the privilege.
The substantive view also prevents the imposition of unprincipled
limitations on the scope of the privilege in cases involving the presenta-
tion requirement. One unprincipled limitation would be the restriction
of the Marchetti rule to tax cases. Although the Marchetti cases involved
taxation schemes, this is a factual setting that was incidental to the re-
sulting rule, not an inherent limit on its scope. The Marchetti reasoning
has been applied to nontax contexts by the Burger Court,2 2 9 and
Marchetti's legal precedent, Albertson,230 involved legislation designed to
protect national security. The substantive view analyzes the Marchetti
cases as stating a generally applicable rule that is not limited to tax cases.
Another possible limitation on the scope of the Marchetti analysis
arises from a mistaken reading of the "'inherently suspect'" class lan-
guage in Albertson and the Marchetti cases. 23' "Inherently suspect of
criminal activities" referred in those cases to the fact that the reporting
requirement was directed exclusively to a class containing a large number
of criminal violators.232 The reports were incriminating because respon-
dents necessarily identified themselves as members of the suspect class.
Aside from a possible coincidence that the criminally suspect class might
overlap with a group of morally suspect persons, there was no discernible
connection between the "inherently suspect" class and moral depravity.
Yet, in Field v. Brown,233 a panel of the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals apparently thought otherwise. The court distinguished
the Marchetti cases partly on the basis that "the retirees' reporting obli-
gation is imposed upon all retired [military] officers, a distinguished and
honorable class manifestly not a 'highly selective group inherently sus-
pect of criminal activities.' "234 If the Field court meant that the suspect
class must be undistinguished or dishonorable for the Marchetti reason-
ing to apply, it seriously misread the law. Such a principle would create
a significant restriction on the Marchetti precedents. The substantive
view easily avoids this pitfall by focusing on the substantiality of the
threat of criminal incrimination to the affected individual. This may turn
229. E.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
230. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965), discussed supra at
text accompanying notes 50-62.
231. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 47; Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79.
232. See supra notes 52-54, 81-83, 107-108 and accompanying text.
233. 610 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court in Field faced a fifth amendment challenge
to a regulation requiring retired military officers working for defense contractors to report
their military sales to the government in order to combat corruption in defense purchases.
Because the claimants had not filed the required reports, a Sullivan presentation issue arose.
See id. at 983 n.3.
234. Id. at 989 (quoting California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)).
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on whether he is a member of a criminally suspect class, but never on
whether he is a member of a morally or socially dishonorable class.
Conclusion
Murphy and Selective Service System together signal a substantial
narrowing of the Marchetti analysis. Both opinions view the presentation
problem as a procedural issue and appear to represent a firm entrench-
ment of this view in the Court's fifth amendment jurisprudence. More-
over, language in both decisions suggests that the Court has engaged in
selective rewriting of the Marchetti analysis in order to restrict it in appli-
cation. These developments portend that affirmative presentation of a
claim of the privilege against self-incrimination will be necessary in more
cases than under the Warren Court's substantive analysis.
More importantly, the Court's recent decisions may presage a return
to the rejected analysis of Kahriger and Lewis: the privilege may not
prohibit the necessary exposure of individual members of particular legis-
latively defined classes of persons. Under that analysis, legislatures would
be free to target classes of persons who engage in illegal conduct and
subject them to highly selective compulsory registration requirements.
Compliance would incriminate a person by necessarily identifying him as
a member of the select, criminally suspect class required to register. Fail-
ure to register would subject the individual to forfeiture of any benefits
conditioned on registration or to prosecution for failure to fulfill the legal
duty to register. Failure to register also would invalidate a claim of the
privilege against self-incrimination to prevent the revocation of benefits
or as a defense in a resulting criminal prosecution.
Although the Marchetti decisions still stand, their analysis, which
prevents highly selective reporting schemes in criminal contexts, appears
substantially curtailed. The current Court apparently intends to restrict
the precedential scope of the Marchetti cases and to glean a modified
procedural analysis from them that in practice undermines the protection
afforded by the privilege against self-incrimination.
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